Apr 13, 2014

Seymour Hersh's New Report

If this is your first time here, I recommend starting from the conclusion page.

Seymour Hersh has recently published another piece on the August 21st attack (analysis of the previous one here). The article is a mix of information and speculation on many issues, which is hard to use as evidence for our purposes, but a close read does seem to point to three interesting information sources, which I'll try to examine here.

The Main Points


A June 20 DIA report assesses that the opposition is attempting to manufacture sarin.

Since Hersh provides direct quotes from the document and in this video claims to be reading from it directly, it does seem fairly reliable. It is also in line with many other indications that the Syrian opposition was attempting to develop sarin.

Since the report was published 3 weeks after Turkey's arrest of opposition operatives attempting to procure sarin precursors, and since most of the quotes from the DIA report provide information that could be deduced from these arrests alone, it seems like this is the primary source of this report. However, the following quote goes further:
Qassab and his associate Khalid Ousta worked with Halit Unalkaya, an employee of a Turkish firm called Zirve Export, who provided ‘price quotes for bulk quantities of sarin precursors’. Abd-al-Ghani’s plan was for two associates to ‘perfect a process for making sarin, then go to Syria to train others to begin large scale production at an unidentified lab in Syria’. The DIA paper said that one of his operatives had purchased a precursor on the ‘Baghdad chemical market’, which ‘has supported at least seven CW efforts since 2004’.
This looks very much like information that would be obtained in the interrogations following the arrests, indicating Turkey has shared this information with the US.


A sarin sample obtained by Russia and analyzed by British Intelligence was found not to match Syria's batches.

This claim is a bit weird, since it requires knowledge of the exact composition of all of Syria's sarin batches, which were secret at the time. Hersh's source (a former intelligence official) explains:
The DIA’s baseline consisted of knowing the composition of each batch of Soviet-manufactured chemical weapons. But we didn’t know which batches the Assad government currently had in its arsenal. Within days of the Damascus incident we asked a source in the Syrian government to give us a list of the batches the government currently had. This is why we could confirm the difference so quickly.
So apparently western intelligence has a source within Syria capable of providing such detailed information on Syria's chemical weapons program. This is possible, but seems a bit unlikely. A more likely explanation is that this sample showed the same traces reported by the UN, which indicate use of very low quality chemicals, and this information got distorted on its way to Hersh's source. Indeed, in a later interview Hersh states that the assessment provided to the President was: "the sarin that we found was not military grade".


Turkey orchestrated the August 21 attacks in an attempt to bring the US to respond.

Of course, this is a severe war crime that would carry life sentences for everyone involved, and Turkey, which was not directly involved in the war, is very unlikely to commit. It therefore requires very strong evidence to be accepted. This does not seem to be the case:
"Principal evidence came from the Turkish post-attack joy and back-slapping in numerous intercepts."
As we've seen in previous intercepted calls, this kind of evidence is not reliable: When such a major event happens, millions of people discuss it, speculate about it, circulate rumors, and attempt to appear more knowledgeable than they really are. It is very easy to misinterpret one of these calls as real evidence - especially from a second hand report.

Furthermore, if this theory was correct it would imply that Turkish intelligence don't know how to avoid being detected by their own police.


The Counter Claims


The article of course generated many responses. I'll review the main counter claims below:


Hersh ignores the evidence that the attack was carried out by Volcanoes - a Syrian government weapon (from Brown Moses)

This is mostly an attack on Hersh's earlier piece which quoted Ted Postol's estimate that the rockets were improvised. This was indeed a major mistake (as analyzed here), which Hersh chose not to repeat. Brown Moses provides two ways to settle this discrepancy with Hersh's false flag theory: Either the Volcanoes were looted, or they were replicated.

The latter is very unlikely, as it would be very complex and costly. The former, however, makes perfect sense, and is currently considered here to be the most likely scenario. BM counters by claiming:
"...the Syrian government has never claimed any of their chemical weapons have been captured by the Syrian opposition, even when required to do so by the OPCW".
Here BM conveniently ignores the strong evidence that the Volcano was never intended to be a chemical weapon. There were two Volcano impact sites documented prior to August 21, both of them clearly showing smoke emanating from the rockets, having no effect on the cameraman. This is typical to incendiary weapons (which coincidentally have warhead designs very similar to chemical warheads).

The various Volcano variants have been spotted numerous times during the civil war, making it one of the most popular heavy weapons used by the Syrian Army. Since practically every type of heavy weapon used by the Syrian Army was captured by the opposition, and since we have evidence of the opposition capturing the small Volcano variant, it is unreasonable to assume that the incendiary Volcanoes were the only weapon to have survived the raids.


The 2 km Volcano range does not exclude government positions (from Brown Moses)

This is an attack on Hersh's statements in follow-up interviews in which he claimed the short range indicates a launch location within opposition control.

Brown Moses provides his analysis of the areas under control of the Syrian government on August 21st, some of which being within 2 km of all impact sites. Here BM chooses to ignore the strong evidence that the launch sites are north to the impact sites (not north-west), in an area that is outside government control, even according to BM's analysis.

Furthermore, the areas marked by BM are based on videos showing government incursions into opposition territory. They are far from being under complete government control, with operations mostly carried out by tanks for short periods, while other videos show opposition fighters operating within this territory. This is an extremely uncomfortable location to launch a Volcano attack - an operation that involves two unarmored trucks and requiring several people to operate in the open.

The two theories to be considered here are therefore:
  1. The Syrian Army chose to launch a chemical Volcano attack on a residential neighborhood from within opposition territory, despite the low-quality Volcano never been used for this purpose, and despite having many long-range dedicated chemical rockets and shells.
  2. The opposition launched the attack using the only rocket they could possibly use - a repurposed looted incendiary rocket, and doing so from within opposition territory, as evidenced by the impact sites and the videos documenting the launch.
Pending new evidence, the latter is by far more likely.

BM also brings up the issue of the M14 rocket reported in Moadamiyah - something that wasn't mentioned in the August 21 discussions for a very long time, and for a good reason. This single M14 body shows no signs of ever being launched, and was recorded a few days earlier in a different location than the claimed impact site. The evidence for a chemical attack on Moadamiyah is highly questionable and should not be used in any productive discussion on the subject.


The amounts ordered by the opposition in Turkey were smaller than the amounts used in the attack (from Dan Kaszeta)

This is a very peculiar line of reasoning, that manages to turn one of the most interesting pieces of evidence for opposition culpability into a counter claim. The fact that we somehow got a glimpse into one of the few attempts in history to produce underground sarin is nothing short of amazing. It is ridiculous to assume that the only time the opposition tried to procure sarin, they were captured. A more likely explanation is that this is a wide-scale operation, and the arrests are just the tip of the iceberg - the unlucky few who got caught.


A sarin sample provided by the Russians cannot be trusted (here)

The idea that within days the Russians fabricated a low-quality sarin sample to deceive the British could not be dismissed, but it is of course much less likely than the straightforward explanation, which also happens to match the other evidence.



Attacking Straw Man Theories



One thing to remember in this discussion is that Hersh is not a researcher of the August 21st attack. He is a journalist with sources in the intelligence community who forward to him interesting information - some reliable, and some less so. Trying to 'win' the discussion by attacking his statements is nothing more than a straw man argument.

This quote is a good example (from Dan Kaszeta):
Somehow, this Sarin was produced, using a secret hexamine acid reduction process hitherto unknown to the world, and only mastered by Syria’s chemical weapons program. It was put into rockets that are exact copies of Syrian ones, down to the paint and bolts. The Sarin-filled rockets were smuggled via the “rat line” into Syria to Damascus, without a single one being caught. And quickly, I should add, due to the short shelf life of binary Sarin. Then they were supposed to be fired onto rebel areas from government positions without the Syrian regime knowing about it? It defies belief.
All of the above are straw man arguments:
  1. There is no evidence of a "secret hexamine process" in Syria (see here).
  2. No one claims the rockets were replicas.
  3. No one claimed sarin was smuggled from Turkey - only precursors.
  4. The rockets were not launched from government positions.
Those who object to the false flag theory, should attack the well researched hypothesis reached in this blog, which could be summarized as follows:
  1. Following the US's clear statement that they will only intervene in Syria following the use of chemical weapons, one of the extreme factions of the opposition chose to carry out a false flag chemical attack, which could potentially win the war and save thousands of lives.
  2. They produced sarin using basic chemicals procured in neighboring countries, and possibly utilizing one of the many labs and factories that they seized and are now under their full control.
  3. In one of their many raids of Army bases, they seized an incendiary Volcano launcher, which would prove to be an ideal weapon.
  4. The perfect opportunity came when Syrian forces were progressing into East Ghouta right when the UN team arrived in Damascus to investigate the Khan Al-Assal incident (which they later determined to be a sarin attack against Syrian soldiers and government-supporting civilians).
  5. The rockets were filled with the low-quality sarin, brought to an opposition-controlled field near the front-line and launched towards the residential neighborhood of Zamalka - a target with low military value, but one which would produce powerful images for the international media.
This is the hypothesis that explains the timing, the motive, the launch location, the sarin quality, the videos of the launch, and all the other evidence, and that is the hypothesis that should be attacked, rather than any other straw man theory.

Furthermore, even if someone were to provide evidence that refutes this theory (which is yet to happen), this would not suffice, as that someone would also need to write an alternative plausible hypothesis that is consistent with the evidence. And once again - despite dozens of requests for such a theory, no one was able to produce one!


Conclusion: Mr. Hersh provides interesting information from his sources, but it cannot be independently verified and is therefore not usable in our investigation. 
  1. The DIA document seems to be mostly based on the Turkey arrests, but does provide more inside information from the interrogations that followed.
  2. The Russian sarin sample sounds reliable and plausible, but does not add any information over the UN's analysis.
  3. The claims of Turkey's involvement are based on weak evidence, which is far below the evidentiary threshold required for such an outrageous claim.

70 comments:

  1. Excellent report but what about the victims? Do you have an opinion about http://thelemniscat.wordpress.com/2014/03/27/did-obamas-rebels-in-syria-kidnap-children-from-latakia-and-murder-them-in-ghouta-chemical-attack-to-justify-us-bombing-of-syria/?

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    1. So far I haven't seen any reliable evidence to support this story. For example, the link you posted doesn't provide evidence that the names and photos are of the same people.
      If you have any evidence, please share. This would be an extraordinary finding if proven true.

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  2. You are doing a great job on this blog, keep up the good work!

    I just want to say that I cannnot agree with the sentence about Turkish government:

    "Of course, this is a severe war crime that would carry life sentences for everyone involved, and Turkey, which was not directly involved in the war, is very unlikely to commit."

    The recording of the Turkish officials talking about the Tomb of Suleyman Shah and create a good reason to start a war with Syria is already a war crime and shows that it isn't very unlikely that Turkey can commit such a war crime.

    I cannot say anything about Hersh's allegations but Turkey has a strong motive to support such a false flag operation.

    And you also shouldn't forget that there is a power struggle going on in Turkey between the government and Gulen movement. Hence it is very likely that Turkish intelligence might not know how to avoid being detected by their own police. Most of those police officers who had taken part in the operation against Turkish intelligence's truck have been moved or reassigned. And they are charged with espionage.

    I think that those two pieces of information might help you better understand Turkey's position in this incident.

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    1. Thank you for the kind words.

      You raise some Interesting points but there's still a dramatic difference between firing "eight missiles into empty land", and an OPCW signatory state producing sarin to be used to kill hundreds of innocent people. Especially considering that the first operation was merely suggested and not executed.

      At this point I find this scenario highly unlikely. It's not impossible, but we'll need much stronger evidence to accept it.

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  3. Thanks for the reply sasa.

    But I am not talking about "the eight missiles which will be fired into empty land".

    If you can access the recording before it is removed you can find that the eight missiles are mentioned at 3:11. But what I was mentioning is at 4:08. Here the chief of the national intelligence agency is saying that the Thomb of Suleyman Shah could be raided if needed which implies that Turkey can attack its own troops to create a reason for war. And surprisingly the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs adds that anything is possible if needed.

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eUpDwj0EkzA

    Hence there is enough proof that the Turkish government can do much more than just firing eight missiles into empty land. I cannot say that this is enough proof for Turkey's involvement in these CW scenarios. But I just wanted to say that it is not very unlikely that anyone in the Turkish government can commit a serious (war) crime.

    BTW my personal opinion is that Turkey wouldn't take part in the production of sarin but definitely has the means of helping the opposition in the process of producing sarin.

    Additionally Turkish government's disinformations about the bombing attack in Reyhanli clearly raise suspicions about their ability to sacrifice innocent people for political reasons.

    Hence what I am saying is just that you should not use the argument "it is very unlikely that Turkish government officials can commit a crime (of any size)" to support or oppose a scenario.

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    1. I definitely believe Turkey (and many other governments) can do false flags and sacrifices, but supporting a wide scale sarin attack on a residential neighborhood is a whole different ball game.

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  4. Thanks for writing these up, Sasa. Hersh's material provides a pretty good alternate scenario, I finally will write one up based on Turkey's central role. Tomorrow if time permits.

    I'm reading the part of Hersh's article that include the Shedd talking-points a little different than you. It doesn't change your conclusion, but there are a lot of interesting nuances between his first and second article on the topic worth noting. Bear with me here: In his first article, Hersh contends that Obama absolute insistance on 'No rebel Sarin capability' is false based on a list of existing intelligence items he should have known. In this article, he's only pointing out he thinks any of them actually affected Obama's decision.

    Real reasons behind postponement
    - Postponement
    ---- Improbable considering Obama's Libyan response
    ---- Military's two arguments primarily responsible
    - Other Influences
    ---- Increasing Turkey suspicions
    -------- Mil and intel were wary of Turkish intent
    -------- Shedd brief: ANF now manufacturing Sarin w/Turkish assistance
    -------- Hersh narrative on arrest/news coverage
    -------- Hersh narrative on additional Shedd brief ANF organization detail
    ---- Khan al Assal
    ---- Ramifications of attack scope
    ---- Porton Down report
    ---- Dempsey warnings
    ---- Blame-sharing tactic
    - Results of Postponement
    - Rationale for Turkey to Seek JAN False-flag CW
    ---- (much detail)

    I think you may be reading Hersh's narrative of the arrest as something other than a minor detail in 'Increasing Turkey Suspicions' section. The preceding two paragraphs are much more damning regarding the intel.

    The arrest seems like a ruse (will add on alternative scenario). In any case, Turkey is pretty contemptuous about the US government, period. I can't imagine they would share details of an interrogation of a JAN member (they support) smuggling suspected CWs through Turkey (which would be damning for Turkey's security capability even if they're not involved). Turkey would be way more likely to cover up embarrassing stuff - it's suspicious that it was even reported. I'll take to the alternative scenario.

    Hersh presents the Turkey angle as if it's only one of the other influences, and not a primary one. No proof, but absolutely astounding to this American if all the pertinent detail is proven true some day.

    Other interesting things:

    Arrests missing from first report: Hersh would have to have know about the arrests in Turkey when he wrote his first article. He didn't use it as a contradictory fact against Obama's 'No opposition Sarin" It would have been weak on it's own so I assume he didn't have the detail to put it in any context.

    In his first article, Hersh said a consultant described a detailed four-page secret cable forwarded to Shedd (also on 20 June, not the 'talking points' document here) describing al Nusra's nerve gas capabilities. A mystery Israeli agent is briefly mentioned collecting a sample from the Mar-Apr attacks without further mention in later cable traffic (again, Irrelevant, but interesting)

    Russian sample and batches: I'm getting the impression that Syria has stockpiles of old USSR Sarin warheads as well as at least one additional variant of their own bulk Sarin for filling warheads. Maybe even a third relatively recent quick-and-dirty DF/hexamine brew they could use in a Volcano. I didn't think about the possibility, but the odd comments about batches matching and 'crude sarin' may have a rational explanation. No proof, so irrelevant for now to the main question.

    Turkish responsible for attack: Hersh develops this claim with far more meaningful background and rationale. I wouldn't argue with your conclusion, but the items you use in your argument are pale in comparison to the core of Hersh's contention. I'll take this one up in the alternative scenarios, too.

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    1. Interesting. Looking forward.
      In your scenario try to invoke Ockham's razor whenever you can. It's important that a scenario not only explains the evidence, but also be plausible - meaning that it doesn't diverge too much from known historical patterns.

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    2. Occam's razor suggests the effort is entirely worthless.

      A Turkish scenario is based on a premise that there are multiple outside actors willing to kill as many Syrian civilians as it takes (indirectly, of course) to remove Assad, and they do this covertly to the greatest extent possible.

      Ignoring those 800 pound gorillas in the room, the scenario has Erdogan and cronies willing to facilitate the deaths of some Syrians to hasten Assad's removal through US involvement.

      Erdogan is doing that through the efforts of a radical jihadi group that could care less about him and is willing to kill as many Syrians as necessary to ensure their religious leader ultimately rules Syria (implying Assad has to go first).

      Erdogan is terrified of the radicals retreating to Turkey if they lose, but he's willing to risk supplying them with Sarin precursors if it increases the chances that Assad will be forced out.

      Ockham didn't leave me much.

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    3. Anyone that's trying to get arms or anything else to the opposition has always had two choices: Lebanon or Turkey.

      Turkey and Lebanon quietly assent and provide a porous border for such as long as there's no direct connection to their governments - plausible denial and all.

      Hersh's rat line was a covert US-run, Qatari/Saudi-financed arms pipeline from Libya to the Turkish border just outside Syria. It was a way to get arms to the rebels and weasel out of directly breaking US and international law. If contractors of contractors of fake CIA companies were only arranging arms purchases on behalf of Qatar/Saudi Arabia and storing their clients' purchases in Benghazi (as well as several other depots), and other unrelated contractors were moving boxes from Libya to warehouses in Turkey, then Hillary Clinton could honestly shriek that the U.S. was not purchasing arms for the rebels.

      The legality of any covert arms smuggling operation is not the point. It wasn't created just to weasel out of the law - it was created to be the dominant arms smuggling operation - discouraging others *and* filtering out weapons (MANPADS) that would threaten NATO and Israel. All this while draining the secret arms markets in Libya. Hersh isn't revealing the rat line existed - he's giving a valid reason for the 'wild west' nature of rebel arms smuggling following the collapse of the strictly-controlled rat line. Arms smuggling didn't simply end forever in 2012.

      Qatar and Saudi Arabia didn't stop financing arms for the rebels after the rat line collapsed, they just had to find some other methods for doing so. They are not going to get involved directly. Just like every other government, they are going to maintain plausible deniability. Using the rat line accomplished that and kept NATO happy. NATO's Libyan house-cleaning operation was never the only option, it was just a convenient one.

      Regardless of who Saudi Arabia and Qatar eventually found to replace the rat line, the arms would still have to flow (illegally) through Lebanon and Turkey. Corrupt leaders that control corrupt intelligence networks and corrupt courts are an obvious place to shop for help. This all just concerns arms and ammunition. Someone has been successfully smuggling both through Turkey for the last year and a half. Erdogan has every incentive to help that happen if it hastens Assad's overthrow. Like the earlier rat line, Erdogan has every incentive to limit the type of weapon. He's not going to let MANPADS go through. Unlike the earlier rat line, Erdogan may have no interest in the arms-buying part.

      I don't think 'the gendarmes' at the lowest levels or even the members of the Turkish courts have a part in this. Turks apparently love Erdogan, but there is a good part of the population that object to any Turkish participation in the Syrian war on ethical and moral grounds.

      Those 'radicals' are probably the same types that object to a corrupt Turkish leadership enriching themselves by abusing their positions. Erdogan is quick to unleash the gas trucks and head-beating police to shut them up. Stiff prison sentences and censorship take care of the rest.

      Gendarmes can be steered away from arms shipments by their leadership and MIT, but they don't seem the least bit happy when they catch smugglers in the act. The end result of these incidents always seems to be the same: suspected smugglers released, gendarmes and judges quit in disgust, complainers are thrown in Turkish prisons.

      "Could/would Erdogan and cronies exploit their existing covert arms-smuggling pipelines for setting up a false-flag" needs to be answered within the context of what was and is going on in Turkey today.

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    4. The details of the March and April attempts at false flags (if that's what they were) are also distinctly different than what happened in August. Erdogan and cronies are unlikely to have either purchased the precursors for the effort or allowed manufacture on Turkish soil. In any case, they would only have supported specific attempts with small quantities of Sarin, and not the establishment of permanent manufacturing capabilities by JAN or anyone else in Syria.

      In any case, the ultimate backers of such a scheme were not going to continue using Erdogan's secret Turkish pipeline if the gendarmes couldn't be controlled. His secret pipeline and support of the effort were only a convenience at one point.

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  5. I think you need to consider equivalent situations before you outright dismiss a Turkish Government involvement - or at least elements of the Government/

    The ISI ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inter-Services_Intelligence ) in Pakistan in particular is an example of how it works. They are essentially the creators of the Taliban. Or at least the favourite Godfathers.

    The existence of the Taliban is a serious problem for the Pakistan Government. However it is actively supported and protected by ISI. It's also probable the Taliban are covertly supported by elements of the Pakistani Government.

    Pakistan is similar to Iraq in religious diversity - for instance the two Bhutto Presidents were both Shia in a majority Sunni country. I understand the ISI is predominately Sunni compared to a mixed Central Government which may in part explain their rogue operation.

    Turkey is more religiously homogeneous that Pakistan but there are clearly internal tensions - political and ethnic. It is entirely plausible that the MIT is self-selected as a political faction and that it has supporters in myriad layers of Government - probably up to cabinet level.

    You also need to consider plausible deniability where the Turkish Government tacitly approves of hostile acts against Syria but is careful to separate itself from the executives who carry out the acts. There are many instances of this behaviour in recent history.

    In terms of enormity, history is littered with examples of otherwise 'nice' Governments doing really bad stuff. The US springs to mind, as do Argentina, many South American Governments, and most in the Middle-East.

    So in conclusion I don't agree with the argument "The Turkish Government wouldn't do it because it's bad / out of norms". In my view it's within historical norms (worldwide and Turkish) and the Government could have done it did it either with central direction or with deliberate recklessness as to the acts of its primary intelligence agency.

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    1. Analogy with ISI in Pakistan doesn't work for me. Hakan Fidan, head of Turkey's MIT, is very, very close to Erdogan. Situations in security apparatus in both countries not comparable. Pakistan is pretty much still ruled by a junta, Turkey'AKP has pretty much kicked out the Turkish junta from power circles (all the way to the courts for a lot of them).

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    2. My argument is not that governments don't do bad things - it's more of a scale. Governments can definitely use false flags occasionally, but a massive sarin attack on a residential neighborhood is way off the charts.

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  7. The problems described for deploying half a ton of Sarin are as difficult for MIT/JAN as for a SAA-side-show trying to do a false false flag.
    Are we sure about this half ton of Sarin needed? I know I´ve been hitting the same nail for some time but let´s just review the evidence.
    I came across Chris´summary: http://www.aug21st.com/slides/AnalysisOfRecoveredChemicalWeapons.pdf
    Compare the ´hot zone´of the "chemical" rocket of Darayaa (4-1-13) and compare it with the 21-8 rockets. No "wetted" surfaces to be seen in this one. Wouldn´t one expect to see some chemical deposit of some sort if this rocket slams in the soil with 3 buckets full of highly corrosive chemicals at the top? Paveway already reported that his "chemical friend" expects all kinds of F-salts (hexamine or other salts). Wouldn´t we be able to see those deposits?
    Please take another look, and if you guys say nothing suspicious about the "sarin impact sites", I promise I´ll stop nagging and trust the rocket narrative!

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    1. Some of my newest post on the Hexamine Again page may explain how a Sarin-filled Volcano might not have any corrosion, Veritas. I try to explain why I changed my view on hexamine and why I think Syria may have been using all along. Since I'm half-asleep, I didn't correct 'OPA' as 'IPA'

      The Syrian options based on their inventory for the second half of DF binary is either a mixture of IPA+Isopropyl amine (OPA) or a mixture of IPA+hexamine. Sorry for the confusion... zzz

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    2. Regarding corrosion. My take on the brown stain on some missiles and in particular the dark drips on the central column is that it is sprayed or poured sealant / protective coating.

      The drip patterns in particular show they occurred well before impact because they line up nicely from when the tube was straight, not when it was bent on impact.

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  8. Paveway,
    That´s not really the point I´m making. Either IPA used or Hexamine or nothing, there should be some visual remnants of these chemicals slamming into to ground. Hexamine is a solid, might dissolve a little in OPA but once bounded with whatever (Cl or F), it becomes a salt. Seen the considerable amount that must have been used to have some effects, it should have been visually noticeable at impact site.
    Compare with the Darayaa 12-4-13 impact site (http://www.aug21st.com/slides/AnalysisOfRecoveredChemicalWeapons.pdf). Probably not Sarin was used there but something else. Effect of "something" clearly seen at impact site. Now for 21-8: Is it likely that 3 buckets of Sarin don´t leave any visual sign of chemicals reacting?
    This half ton of Sarin being transported in WW1-type rockets into a combat zone takes a high-risk taking-creative mind. The risks were the same for which ever side did it. Accepting these scenarios gives me an awkward feeling, does´t seem right.
    Let us concentrate on the impact sites again. Compare with previous ones. Do these sites look like a high quantity of chemicals were present there?
    I repeat my promise, no more nagging if I get a clear answer!!

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    1. I must say I have no idea whether the by-products should be visible or not.
      As to the Daraya rockets - those are clearly a different chemical, most likely an incendiary.

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    2. There would be 29 kilos of agent and HF complex (assuming Hexamine)

      If the agent was Isopropylamine there would be little residue of it itself as it boils at 32C so it would be long ago evaporated. The HF it bound to is also volatile but you'd expect to see excess Fluorides in the soil and structures.

      If the agent was Hexamine you'd expect to see some traces of it as it takes a while to evaporate. You'd also see an excess of Fluorides in the area.

      Both cases assume the agent releases HF over time and that the agent-HF complex is not itself particularly volatile.

      There is a new theory shortly to be published that the majority of the Sarin and HF-Agent complex was deposited in the immediate area of the strike rather than dispersed widely.

      Given all that I've not seen any sign of agent in the area of the strikes. If it was Hexamine you might see some powder and there would surely still be several kilos of Hexamine in the process of subliming when the UN investigated.

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    3. Veritas: I agree the impact sites don't look like anything like what you would expect from a good portion of a 60kg can of Sarin slamming into the ground at terminal velocity. I haven't given up on an alternate dispersal method yet. I just put it on the shelf for now since there's no credible evidence. "The impact sites look kind of sketchy" is a good reason to consider alternatives, but won't sell one by itself.

      Charles: My novel on why hexamine might have been used was added to the previous article. I'm thinking that you may be able to remove a good amount of the the hexamine and hexamine(HF) from the Sarin before use, and that's specifically why Syria may have switched to it.

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    4. Charles,
      Why would there be 29 kgs of agent? Is that taking into account the density of Sarin? But it is still 60 l then.
      You say if the neutralizing agent is IPA, it could evaporate at 32 C. But I guess the IPA would also be present as a salt, the IPA-HF salt. That salt will probably not evaporate as IPA at 32C?
      HF will be released mainly by decomposing Sarin, not necessarily by the decomposing neutralizer salt.
      In any case, maybe there is some truth in UN report. No neutralizing salts were found, so maybe there was no neutralizer used. Why do we keep on adding imaginary info to fit the rocket-narrative?

      Paveway,
      I personally think the alternative dispersal scenario fits the evidence better than the rocket scenario:
      - suspicious impact craters
      - no visual residual chemicals (also no etching effect sand)
      - no "in situ" victim footage
      - suspicious victim composition
      - suspicious Míya scenario with transported victims
      - proven framing of M´iya rocket
      - lack of footage of "all" reported rockets ( only footage of 5 or is it less?)
      - suspiciously vague UN-report

      Sasa,
      I have the impression we can conclude that the impact sites look at least a little suspicious concerning containing 60 kg of highly corrosive Sarin. Maybe an alternative antithese page would be nice?
      I promised not to nag anymore if impact sites were recognized as non-suspicious. But since that hasn´t happened, you can always block me if you want me to stop being stubborn:)

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    5. Veritas - there are 48 kg of Sarin and up to 29 kg of Hexamine/HF complex assuming Hexamine is used as the absorbing agent. The numbers for IPA are slightly different.

      Hexamine and IPA form a complex with HF, not a salt. I have been unable to find the physical properties of the complexes.

      "A complex is a molecular entity formed by loose association involving two or more component molecular entities (ionic or uncharged), or the corresponding chemical species.

      The bonding between the components is normally weaker than in a covalent bond. "

      http://www.chemicool.com/definition/complex.html

      Weak bonding indicates the complexes are relatively unstable compared to an actual salt. Hence you should expect HF releases from the complex. Sarin releases HF when hydrolised, so surface water, dew, and water vapour all cause decomposition.

      Hexamine forms a complex of 1-4 HF atoms so the exact quantity needed is uncertain in operational conditions without further data.

      Delete
    6. You have to buy my "Syria didn't use in-flight-mixed binary Sarin warheads" argument first before anything about my hexamine argument makes sense.

      If you don't by it and think Syria *was* using it's Sarin precursors for in-flight-mixed binary Sarin warheads, then ignore all of my rationale about hexamine. It wouldn't be used for those warheads, period.

      Delete
    7. veritas,
      I definitely can't dismiss your suspicions, but I also can't confirm the impact sites should have had corrosion signs. We must get a chemistry expert opinion here...

      Delete
    8. Sasa,
      One more question:
      You can´t dismiss MY suspicions. But what do YOU think? Are you entirely comfortable with "the rockets contained 60 l of Sarin and caused all we have seen thereafter?

      Delete
    9. Definitely not 'comfortable', but it does seem to make the most sense. I prefer scenarios that are relatively simple.

      They wanted to stage an attack. They had incendiary Volcanos from a previous raid, filled them with their low-quality sarin, went to a safe area that would allow matching the trajectories to SAA positions and launched.

      A straightforward plan that requires only a handful of people and is very effective.

      Delete
    10. Risk of rockets was high. If false flag, detonating some where else in confined area much simpler ...

      What do you think of O´Brien´s latest: http://logophere.com/Ghouta%20Massacre/Contents.htm

      Delete
    11. Unfortunately it's way longer than I can afford to read. If anyone sees any new evidence there, please share.

      Delete
    12. Your earlier Occam's razor remark and simple scenarios preference comment are perplexing given the situation, Sasa.

      The raid(s) would have had to produced at least two (maybe more) two-tube launchers self-equipped with a crane or with a crane-equipped loader. The SAA wasn't known to use multiple launch trucks or fire any more than a few of the rockets at a time, so finding a stash of 18 or even 12 in a bunker somewhere other than the main construction facility is pretty lucky. All the rockets they took needed to be a liquid-fillable type equipped with the proper bursting charge in front (not HE type). They would also have to have located as many motors and igniters, but both may have already been installed in the rocket. They also would have had to find enough nose fuzes - that's assuming the type they used for an incendiary payload provided a sufficiently high air burst. They may have needed the device sometimes inserted in the rear of the can when they arm the rockets - presuming they knew what it was and what to look for. Let's just say they were really lucky though and found enough complete rockets ready to go.

      They would have had to remove the fuzes, empty out whatever they contained (say an incendiary mixture of some kind) and clean them out well enough that fresh Sarin wouldn't react with anything in some kind of unexpected way.

      Around the time the OPCW teams got into Damascus, they would have to bring the emptied rockets and several hundred liters of fresh Sarin together - either where the rockets were stored or where the Sarin was mixed. After filling those rockets with a corrosive mixture they were not designed to hold and sealing them up, they need to be handled by crane and loaded into the tubes of a launch truck.

      The launch truck(s) are covered and sent on their way with more trucks carrying additional rockets. They position these at the launch point located somewhere near regime-held territory to the northwest, but out of sight or otherwise ignored by regime observers.

      Someone in a chem suit finishes arming the warheads in the dark, and the rockets are successfully launched. Despite the noise and intensely-bright three-second engine burn in an area without electricity and lights,, the launch also goes unnoticed by the regime. Assad's artillery would be setting up for shelling East Ghouta by now, but they don't react to the launch and nobody fires at the launch trucks. Which is fortunate because they have to reload the launch tubes with a crane, in the dark, with more Sarin-filled rockets and repeat the process.



      The alternative: locate a few relatively recent, suitable and photogenic spent rocket impact sites to blame. Right after the attack, report those along with a number of other widespread but evenly dispersed set of impact sites. They only have to look good on a map - nobody is going to check all of them. Make sure there's something for the OPCW to find at the closest ones. The sites further in? Sorry, OPCW - it's not safe to take you there.

      You have to release some Sarin, but be sure to avoid the field clinics with the plumes - you need them to be spared for the dramatic video. You have to contaminate the sites and expose some people to non-lethal doses, but mostly rely on whatever other non-lethal but toxic chemicals you have laying around to provide plenty of panicking 'Sarin victims' in the clinics. That's it - let YouTube and the OPCW do the rest for you. There's the matter of all the bodies, but I would guess that's just another 'easy' part for JAN or ISIS.

      Delete
    13. Yes Paveway! Agree!

      Delete
    14. Sasa,
      Concerning O´Brien piece, indeed very loooong read. What I have retained up to now is that video´s In KB are showing dying and dead people but not consistent with narrative that is accompanying it. According to O´Brien it´s rather a place of execution than treatment.

      I have had doubts about medical treatment before (this video really shows why...http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fSvm8mDZyOY&list=PLPC0Udeof3T4NORTjYmPoNCHn2vCByvYG). O´Brien´s report adds to my suspicions. If confirmed, FF includes network of people, not just a few individuals.

      Delete
  9. Did you see this analysis of Hersh's article?"

    http://www.mintpressnews.com/the-failed-pretext-for-war-seymour-hersh-eliot-higgins-mit-professors-on-sarin-gas-attack/188597/

    ReplyDelete
  10. And now another report by famous investigative journalist Gareth Porter.

    http://truth-out.org/news/item/23368-new-data-raise-further-doubt-on-official-view-of-aug-21-gas-attack-in-syria

    He even reads whoghouta and hat-tips Sasa Wawa!

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Finally you get the credit you deserve for calculating the range of the rockets Sasa!

      Good summary article! Porter assumes the sarin mixture was less lethal than assumed. Then what killed the children seen in http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fSvm8mDZyOY&list=PLPC0Udeof3T4NORTjYmPoNCHn2vCByvYG) ? Maybe as O´Br says, something else did?

      Delete
  11. Have you seen this from the Golan heights? FAE or mustard gas?
    http://allainjules.com/2014/04/30/video-syrie-attaque-chimique-contre-larmee-arabe-syrienne-par-jabhat-al-nusra/

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. It's not Mustard Gas. That takes up to a day to take effect and starts out in moist areas like groin and armpit and sweaty skin.

      There was a very large explosion in Tel Al-Jaabiyah on April 24. It is possible these are shock-wave victims related to that explosion.

      Denis O'brien suggests the bodies may have had their ammo pouches rifled and the cannisters from their gas-masks removed leaving the rubber face-pieces on the ground. He also notes they are fresh - only just into rigor-mortis.

      It is curious however that there is little or no blast damage and the darkening is on the faces and not other exposed skin.

      Delete
  12. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZPLtW8s3GSM

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=e4c_1398361512

      Delete
    2. That's a lot of fog for hill in the middle of a desert. It could have been radar-obscuring smoke (damn near a CW). The Syrians have those S-300s hid somewhere and it's best not to let them see you first. The Syrian anti-aircraft lines on the Golan and along the Mediterranean Coast (Lattakia) have been picked off one-by-one in the last six weeks. What better way to do that then hire some TOW 2A-equipped head-choppers to help out.

      Nighttime vid of the Tel al Jabiya strike shows the unmistakable fireball sparkles of a GBU-112. It's a GBU-109 with a thermobaric payload for taking out underground installations.

      Israel only has GBU-109s (courtesy of U.S. taxpayers):

      http://defenseupdates.blogspot.com/2012/12/israel-orders-6900-jdam-kits-in-647.html

      If it was a GBU-112, then it either came from a U.S. aircraft or Kerry smuggled a few in during his visit.

      Delete
  13. New report on Ghouta Sarin. This time suggesting the number of victims was severely exaggerated and possibly some hanky-panky with the victims shown to the UN

    "U.N. Probe Chief Doubtful on Syria Sarin Exposure Claims"

    http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/05/u-n-probe-chief-doubtful-syria-sarin-exposure-claims/

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Charles,
      What does that tell us about the positive results for biomedical samples in first UN-report? Only two possibilities here: Hanky-panky with victims or not. If we decide Hanky-Panky is the most plausible, it has serious consequences for Sasa´s conclusion.

      Delete
    2. Veritas,

      I'm tending to think it was a half-hearted false-flag backed up with evidence tampering.

      The lack of miosis in clinical notes for most of the victims examined is fairly dramatic. Mix in that they mostly still tested positive to Sarin by-products and you start to smell large-scale conspiracy. The discrepancy has been discussed on other pages here. It also provides a neat explanation of Moadimiyah 'victims'

      The number of deaths has clearly been exaggerated for political purposes and the locations exaggerated as well. For instance it's impossible for anyone in Jobar to have been hurt by gas but victims were reported from there.

      My best guess is that smallish quantities of Sarin mixed in with other chemicals were chucked down range killing a relatively small number of people, and then the local activists jazzed up the forensic evidence for the selected 'victims' seen by the UN.

      Delete
    3. "My best guess is that smallish quantities of Sarin mixed in with other chemicals were chucked down range killing a relatively small number of people, and then the local activists jazzed up the forensic evidence for the selected 'victims' seen by the UN."

      This scenario is supported by all the evidence and is the most plausible.


      Delete
  14. Charles, Sasa
    Lots of elements don´t fully match the conclusion made in this blog. I know Charles, your opinion is very respected and that your doubts will be noted by the contributors. I hope Sasa can still find the energy to make a review page of the conclusion using the new insights.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. The ultimate editorial opinion here is Sasa Wawa, not me or anyone else.

      The blog is open to comment and I've contributed some material which has either flown or not. As have many other contributors.

      Given that, I don't think my opinion on the facts of Ghouta are significantly different to Sasa Wava's. There may be detail differences but the general concept of a false flag attack and a degree of false information seems pretty constant.

      Delete
  15. LRB Letters Vol. 36 No. 10 · 22 May 2014

    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n10/letters#letter1%20letter%20to%20the%20LRB

    Whose sarin?

    Jamie Allinson makes some false technical claims in his critique of Seymour Hersh (Letters, 8 May). What Hersh reports is entirely plausible, and consistent with facts that emerged from our more limited but irrefutable technical studies of the circumstances surrounding the nerve agent attack in Damascus on 21 August 2013. Our findings, which have become the basis for the ‘new’ arguments being made against Hersh by people like Allinson, and supposedly knowledgeable non-government organisations like Human Rights Watch and the New York Times, raise the most serious questions about whether the White House lied about technical intelligence associated with the attack.

    Allinson is correct that the improvised rockets he calls Volcanoes each contained about fifty litres of sarin, but wrong in his claim that they were fired from a regime-held area ‘to the north’. These claims are not original, but repeat those of Eliot Higgins, a blogger who, although he has been widely quoted as an expert in the American mainstream media, has changed his facts every time new technical information has challenged his conclusion that the Syrian government must have been responsible for the sarin attack. In addition, the claims that Higgins makes that are correct are all derived from our findings, which have been transmitted to him in numerous exchanges.

    Before we began reporting findings from our analyses, there were published reports estimating that the sarin load carried by the rockets was about five litres. We showed, from detailed engineering analyses of rocket debris, that the rockets contained as much as fifty litres. This finding was hailed by members of the US government and non-government organisations, such as Human Rights Watch and the New York Times, as proof that the Syrian government had executed the atrocity of 21 August. In a follow-up analysis, we found that it could not possibly have been the case that the deadly rockets were fired from Syrian government-controlled areas as far as ten kilometres away, as claimed by the US government and non-government organisations. We showed that the shape of the rockets resulted in extreme aerodynamic drag, limiting their range to about 2 to 2.5 kilometres. This finding was met with great resistance in the media.

    We also analysed the impact debris from the single rocket for which data was available (there is no data for multiple rocket impacts despite Allinson’s claim). We showed that those who argued that the Syrian government had fired the rockets had incorrectly determined the direction of arrival as being from the northwest. We showed that the actual direction was from the north. This new technical insight quickly prompted a new ‘discovery’. There was a checkpoint to the north, close to the area controlled by Syrian government forces, from which the deadly short-range rockets could have been launched. However, if they had been fired from this location, the impact pattern of the rockets used in the attack would have required them to have a range well in excess of five kilometres – which we have shown cannot be the case.

    We do not claim to know who was actually behind the attack of 21 August in Damascus. But we can say for sure that neither do the people who claim to have clear evidence that it was the Syrian government. The mainstream American media have done a disservice to the public by allowing politically motivated individuals, governments, and non-government organisations to misrepresent facts that clearly point to serious breaches of the truth by the White House.

    Richard Lloyd; Ted Postol
    Spokane, Washington; Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I think this letter kind of draws a line under the Brown Moses conspiracy theory, finally.
      If one ever needed a clear cut case of the MSM creating a patsy in order to do their dirty work for them; Eliot is that case.

      Moving on we have the recent report that Sellstrom doubts the casualty figures in Ghouta and with question marks over the amount of Sarin actually used; evidence manipulated; patients moved....etc. All of a sudden all of those conspiracy theorists who were screaming "Assad-done-it" have all went very quiet rather quickly.

      Another interesting point to note that I haven't seen picked up on is this (from Hersh, Diken interview);

      "You know when he (Postol) first called me months ago (after the first piece), told me: “Hersh, you are in really trouble this time. You are wrong!” Later he wrote back to me and said “Shit!”

      I find that significant as it shows that Hersh, through old fashioned sources, was told a narrative that Professor Postol believed didn’t sit with the evidence only to later change his mind and have to backtrack.

      I don’t think we’ve heard the last from Hersh on this nor have we heard the last from Lloyd & Postol.

      Delete
  16. New variant of 122 Volcano. Much nicer paint-job, now has a nose-cone, and it's a different motor - much less aluminum loading so very little smoke.

    Burn time 1.7 seconds - much as before. Quite possibly it's a standard 122mm motor rather than the custom types they've been using and the nose-cone is to compensate for the reduced total impulse.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QomWYXBgG44

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Also, new tail fins.

      The backing song على الجبال خلف التلال وفي الوديان ستهزمون ستهزمون ( On the mountains behind the hills and in the valleys they will defeat, they will defeat) is the Lebanese / Hezbollah version rather than the Syrian Army version

      Delete
  17. Greetings Sasa (or Mr. Wawa? :) ) - I think I've said what a cool effort this is. I hope you're still active or prepared to be. Much has been questioned, but important questions remain un-asked. I'm reaching out to see if you'd be willing to help in that part too, maybe by hosting some of the material posing the questions. it would sure give you something to do, and things so far have gone well when you're involved.

    I intend to challenge the "Sarin Myth" (that it's what killed people that night) I understand the basis for it, and it's not so great, and I think it's open to way more question than it's gotten. 2 things relevant to Ghouta I have drafted that I'd ask you to consider publishing:

    1) I have small blurb on the six (evidentiary) links making up the official story that introduces the links challenged or destroyed, and the two or three needing review - rockets-Sarin, Sarin-victims, and victims-helpers. The rocket thing has its own issues that could be a third thing, but the second thing ...
    2) A really big article about the Kafr Batna morgue study Denis O'Brien recently did. Have you been hipped to this yet? You should. The signs suggest this hundred were killed with CO or Cyanide, not Sarin, except one who required a cut to the throat to finish the deal. "Murder In The SunMorgue. A Critique of the Sarin Myth and a Cyber-Investigation of the Ghouta Massacre Mystery." by Denis R. O'Brien. August 14, 2014. Project page. Have a look at that or e-mail me at caustic_logic#yahoo.com so I can send you
    my article to summarize it, and to consider running here - it takes some space, about 5,000 words total. Could be split in parts maybe, etc. A passage:
    "Even those who question the government’s guilt tend to see through the same Sarin-misted lens. “Sasa Wawa” of the research blog Who Attacked Ghouta, Gareth Porter, Seymour Hersh, and others focus on rockets filled with the stuff, but the rebels’ improvised version of it (which exists) and fired by the rebels (which is the best reading). [8] But in fact those rockets, and both sides’ Sarin supplies, might be largely – or totally - irrelevant to what happened that night."

    - Adam/Caustic

    ReplyDelete
  18. Sasa, I have a temporary posting of the big article, still hoping to go somewhere else tolerant enough of its "big-boned" frame.

    If you're seeing these questions, please pop in with a comment. You should at least have a post here for your thoughts on this subject, which may take off soon (a higher profile journo is considering a piece on it)

    ReplyDelete
  19. Everyone - Apologies for not responding. I'm finding it hard to dedicate the necessary time for serious research of the new developments.
    Hopefully, I will be able to do so later on.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Yay you're alive and responsive! For my part, no rush. Or pressure. I'll leave you with the tips and see where to put this thing. Maybe right where it is will do.

      Delete
  20. New variant yet again of the Burkan missile.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c_GRxu4MvWE

    This time with a shortened rocket tube allowing the internal 122mm fins to show plus elongated tube fins and what looks like bolt attachment points on the rocket tube.

    The main body is elongated to significantly longer than the 'chemical' version - however I've never been convinced the 'chemical' version was the same length as the HE version to start with.

    See https://www.dropbox.com/sh/ggqx0715662rjfm/AADN2zM6MIWWLDhYWOPfgS0ja for images

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I'm pretty sure it's a rough clone. Maybe HA or even DAESH? Any Arabic speakers to translate what they are saying?

      Delete
    2. I've had Arabic speakers translate the comments. Apparently it's called Roar of Lion - Assad means Lion. They (in the video) laughed at it and called it Roar of Donkey. There was also mention of 200kg of explosives (?)

      Another Arabic speaker gave this translation that's sort of consistent but different

      0:00 Cameraman "A rocket is being loaded, that haven't detonated. May god return to you what your hands have brought forth"
      0:22 Cameraman "A rocket that is called "Earthquake"
      0:23 Rebel "Yeahhh this is the Earthquake Shaikhi the Earthquake"
      0:36 "Brother be careful, for what is precious to you (as in for gods sake)"
      0:40 "Come on (moving the rocket) Snackbar, its cracking, the sheet is not going to handle it"
      0:44 "Pray to the prophet (common saying its along the lines of "relax calm down, have faith")
      0:47 Rebel "Load it on the car, load it" Cameraman "One minute one minute"
      0:50 "Come on... go (as in push it)snackbar"

      The location means there is no ISIS around so barring any of the local insurgents shooting at them, I think it's more likely to be a Hezbollah missile.

      It certainly looks similar in proportion to the Hezbollah 107mm IRAM http://bayanbox.ir/id/3720441054719591925?view and may fullfill the same role of a very short range bunker buster rather than a 2km artillery piece.

      Delete
    3. ""Come on (moving the rocket) Snackbar, its cracking.."

      LOL @ snackbar. Nearly choked there. What makes it funnier is how it was slipped into the translation LOL

      Delete
  21. New 122mm Volcano (variant) video. Looks like they have made some improvements.

    Key times;
    1. 1:04 to1:15 = 122mm Volcano in shipping container with a good look at the nose fairing, warhead, rocket motor housing, markings, color, etc.
    2. 1:22 to 1:27 = Good view of rocket motor nozzle and new fins.
    3. 2:04 to 2:10 + 2:26 to 2:31 = Good view of Volcano launches, rocket motor burn time, rocket motor burn signature (smoke/flame, etc) and launched rocket trajectories.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QomWYXBgG44&feature=player_detailpage

    ReplyDelete
  22. Another new 122mm Volcano (upgraded) video? It Looks like an HE warhead but this version doesn't appear to have a rear port in the baseplate of the warhead.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ALUJpK5l25o

    ReplyDelete
  23. More sarin news, hard to verify
    http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20195

    ReplyDelete
  24. See my comment on the Hexamine Again Post.

    I think it's now Game, Set, and Match against the Hexamine theory.

    ReplyDelete
  25. BREAKING:
    Cylinders found in rebel-controlled area in Syria contained prohibited gas - OPCW
    Laboratory tests performed in the middle of June, 2014, showed that the cylinders seized by Syrian government troops in August 2013 in an area controlled by anti-Assad rebels had contained sarin, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said in his letter to the Security Council, the ITAR-TASS news agency reports.

    Two 'abandoned' cylinders seized in Syria contained sarin - U.N. – Reuters
    ‘Abandoned’ barrels containing deadly sarin seized in rebel-held Syria
    – RT
    Two cylinders seized by regime held sarin: U.N. – The Daily Star, Lebanon
    Two cylinders seized by Syria forces contained sarin: UN – PressTV

    Meanwhile in Western media:
    On foreign policy, Obama is succeeding – Boston Globe

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Thanks! I'll add it to the Jabor Lab page.

      Delete
    2. But did they detect Hexamine?

      Delete
  26. Re: jody wave – Jun 02:
    Another new 122mm Volcano (upgraded) video?
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ALUJpK5l25o

    The launch site looks almost exactly like how I have visioned the launch site in the al-Nusra chemical launch video: Launch vehicle placed sideways on a 4-lane motorway with lampposts and war damages, trees all around.

    It would be interesting to geolocate this video.

    ReplyDelete
  27. Assad continues use of chemical weapons on his population:

    "The global chemical-weapons watchdog found evidence that chlorine gas was used "systematically and repeatedly" as a weapon in northern Syria, where witnesses described poison barrel bombs crashing into their villages from the sky, the agency said on Wednesday in a report obtained by Reuters"


    ReplyDelete